CURRENT SCENARIO IN INDIA CHINA RELATIONSHIP

India china bondage-

1. Two nations forged a new model of relationship between the two ancient civilization and rising asian power.

2. Recognizing and learning from the difference in the impact of reform and globalization as well as in national policies and institutions, has been enabling from both sides. The baseline cultural practices , the strong presence of patriarchal modes, a sexual division of labour, a marked preference for son is similar in both countries

3. Defying the construction of india and china as rivals and competitiors, the last decade has seen seven two ways visits by the leaders of the two countries. the visits included : Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (2003),Premier Wen Jiabao (2005,2010), President Hu Jinato (2006), Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2008) And Premier Li Keqiang(2013). There were also two visits linked to BRICS summits Manmohan Singh visited Sanya , China in2011 and President Hu travelled to New Delhi in 2012.

4. The two countries established a new mechanism of special representatives to resolve the boundary dispute during vajpayees visit in 2003.

5. During the visit of Chinese , Premier wen to India in dec.2010, the two sides jointly set a bilateral trade target of US $ 100 billion for 2015.

6. Taking a long range view the two countries have also launched a strategic economic dialogue for coordination on macro economics issues and the sharing of relevant developmental experiences in eradicating poverty and creating sustainable urbanization.

7. In the military sphere the two asian powers are now looking to build greater trust and intensify interactions between their top military bases. India and china held their first counter terror exercise entitled hand to hand in Kunming in 2010 and are poised to hold another round later next year.

8. From the spread of Buddhism to china a few centuries ago and the popularity of bollywood films like three idiots in china in more recent times, there has been a constant cultural intermingling over the centuries.

9. Chinese food, calligraphy and the Chinese language are finding new devotee in India everyday.

10. China look poised to scale up investment in India and participate in special business part.

11. The recently signed Border defence pact is a case in point.

12. The prospects of a RTA, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement and proposal for setting up industrial zones are being looked into.

13. India is talking on the concepts and alignment of Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor.

14. China has outlined several other overland projects to connect India from east. In the north, there seems no escaping from the impact of chinas development plan in Tibet and xinjiang in south Asia. The Golmud Lhasa railway had already knocked down. The Great Himalayas a rail line to Shigaste and then to Nepal, Bhutan and eventually to India will soon become a reality. By 2017 a parallel railway line is expected to come up even along the Tibet xinjiang National highway no.-219 that runs through Aksai-chin.

15. 60 points ,2700 words document titled Resolution Concerning Some Major Issues In Comprehensively Deeping Reforms released by the communist party of china on nov.15 proved to be a very detailed outline for framework of economic reforms for china. For the first time private sector will be treated as an equal of the sector as the party looks to establish a mixed ownership economy. To enable this it will eliminate barriers to entry in sector monopolies, allowing industries such as telecommunication to be open to Chinese private companies. Foreign companies will now be allowed to enter the service sector in industries such as commerce and healthcare, among others. This could present a real opportunity for Indian pharmaceutical companies to gain a foothold in what will grow to be trillion dollar industry.

16. Their coordination and consultation in international climate change negotiations have been instrumental in protecting the interests of developing countries.

17. In multilateral forces like BRICS, India and china speaks in the same voice on resolving difficult issues like Iran and Syria through dialogue and diplomacy.

18. People to people contact between India and china are rising despite difficult relation over 10,000 Indian students are studying in china over half million Indians visit china every year.

India-China MoU on Transboundary Rivers

During his recent official visit to China from October 22 - 24 2013, Indian Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on transboundary rivers.
According to the new MoU, Beijing has agreed to provide New Delhi richer hydrological data on
river Brahmaputra during the flood season (May 15 to October 15). As part of the MoU, India
can also ask for data relating to dams being built by China on river Brahmaputra. Prior to this,
India and China has signed four MoUs/agreements on transboundary rivers water sharing: (a)
MoU between the Ministry of Water Resources of India and Ministry of Water Resources of
China on the provision of hydrological information of Brahmaputra river in flood season by
China to India in 2002; (b) MoU on sharing of hydrological information of the Sutlej river in
flood season by China to India in 2005;(c) an expert level mechanism was set up to discuss
interaction and co-operation on sharing flood season hydrological data, emergency management
and other issues regarding trans-border rivers in 2006; and (d) a follow-up MoU in 2008 on the
provision of hydrological information on the Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra river in flood season by
China to India from 2008-2012.
India China EXPLORING PARTNERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN-

1. Afghanistan has become an enthusiastic member of SAARC.

2. Afghanistan has an observer status in the SCO, an enthusiastic led by china.

3. Afghan economy is more likely to be connected to Chinese and Indian economies than they are to Europe partly because of proximity but also because of the availability of markets for afghan goods in India and china. This has been proven in central Asia where the economies are now closely linked to china. India alone imports millions of dollars worth dry fruits, spices, carpets, wool etc. from Afghanistan which can be easily expanded.

4. The afghan economy driven by low wage subsistence agriculture and massive unemployment can only be dealt by learning from the Chinese and Indian experience.

5. It is only china and India that can commit large scale investment in Afghanistan needed for its reconstruction the process has already begun.

6. China could take advantage of Indias cultural familiarities in Afghanistan.

7. Being conscious about Afghanistans human heritage, both countries can jointly rebuild Afghanistans rich archaeological sites, which alone can revive Afghan tourism industry and generate billions of dollar revenue and jobs for its people.

8. There is no case for competition, India has a clearly cut out role to perform in the Afghan i.e. health, education, tourism and cultural affairs.

9. Together India and china could train the Afghan army and build its defense capabilities.
POINTS TO LOOKS FOR?

* The intentions behind Chinas military modernisation are unclear.

* China is also expanding its presence and influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.

* Chinese and Indian interests are beginning to overlap in a number of areas extending from the Pacific to Africa.

* Going forward, Indian policy-makers will need to develop an overarching framework which deals with elements of cooperation and competition in Sino-Indian relations.

* In the last few years, Sino-Indian relations have expanded considerably in all areas. Institutional framework for mutual cooperation has also been developed. However, from time to time, misunderstanding and lack of mutual trust manifest despite the massive increase in Sino-Indian trade and economic relationship. The challenges for India in the next few years will be to manage the complex relationship with China while protecting its national interests.

* The issues of military modernisation and economic relations have been addressed in a political context rather than in technical terms so a different approach is needed in this aspect.

INDIA-China ECONOMIC RELATIONS


* in years to come, issues like continued trade imbalance and competition for depleting resources are likely to create friction in economic relationship.

* Geopolitical and geostrategic considerations are also likely to start impacting this relationship.

* In the next 5-10 years, China will continue to be Indias single largest trading partner and there is unlikely to be any major change in the pattern of trade with India exporting raw materials and importing capital goods,machinery and components from China. Indias own manufacturing sector may not take off so remarkably in next few years, such that all available minerals will be used indigenously. However, going forward, exportable surplus of raw materials is bound to come down with growing domestic demand and policies discouraging raw material exports. It is difficult to visualise a scenario in which the bilateral trade will bemore equitable any time soon. On the contrary, there is a likelihood that the trade imbalance will grow as the export of minerals from India declines and China makes a push for increasing exports of its plant, machinery and manufactured goods to compensate for impending slowdown in exports to Western markets. There is already a concern in India about growing trade imbalance favouring China, estimated to be about $20 billion which, if not corrected urgently, may be detrimental to sustain healthy bilateral trade relations. There is an increasing demand from India on China to facilitate larger imports from the former to address the issue of trade imbalance. India would be focusing on exporting precision engineering goods, IT services and pharmaceutical products to China.

* Although there is great potential for bilateral trade between the two countries to grow further, this potential can only be realised if China permits imports from India without imposing non-tariff barriers, and trade imbalance is reduced.

* In the face of growing disquiet against China dumping cheap and, at times, poor quality equipment and goods thus harming the interests of domestic industry, India may have to take unilateral measures to curb imports from China. This will create friction unless China acts swiftly to increase imports from India.

* if industrialisation in Tibet creates mass disaffection, as evoking loot-of-national-wealth is a running theme in Tibetan nationalist discourse, then the security situation in Tibet may worsen and migration of Tibetans to India may accelerate, which may impact India-China relations. The Government needs to be watchful of the development process in Tibet and popular reactions to it.

* A high level of mutually beneficial economic interdependence between them can help in managing inevitable competition for securing resources, markets and trade with other countries.

* A rising China is not likely to accept a peer competitor in its neighbourhood.

* Geopolitical aspirations of the two countries and differences in value systems may always weigh upon bilateral relations.

* Rising trade volumes have not stopped China from creating additional friction points like stapled visas for residents of Jammu & Kashmir and damming of Brahmaputra.
THE BORDER DISPUTE


* So far there have been around 37 rounds of talks at various levels.

* in the 1980s, the two countries held eight rounds of vice-minister level talks; the Joint Working Group (JWG), instituted after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhis visit to China in 1988, has met 15 times; and the special representative mechanism, an outcome of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayees visit in 2003, has held 14 rounds of talks. The last round of special representatives talks took place in October 2010. All that these talks have managed to achieve are two CBM agreements signed in 1993 and 1996; the exchange of maps in the Central Sector in 2000; and the setting of political parameters for resolving the boundary dispute in 2005.

* Some Indian analysts have argued that China has become less interested in resolving the boundary dispute and has recently become more assertive about its claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and particularly Tawang. They see a connection between the cementing of India-US relationship in 2005 and the hardening of Chinas position on Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh. In support of their argument, they cite Chinas hyper-reaction to Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs visit to Tawang and India giving the Dalai Lama permission to visit Tawang; Chinas objection to an Asian Development Bank loan for a project in Arunachal Pradesh; and the Chinese Ambassadors statement that Arunachal Pradesh is part of China,
on the eve of the Chinese President Hu Jintaos visit to India in 2006.


* Chinas stance with regard to the status of Sikkim continues to be ambiguous even after having recognised it as part of India in 2003.


TIBET



* The Indian disappointment is that India has made two unilateral concessions by extending its support to the One China policy and accepting Chinas sovereignty over Tibet, but it has not received any concession from China in return on the border issue. In this context, some Indian analysts have argued that India should take a fresh look at its Tibet policy. They say that the Chinese non-compliance with 1954 agreement between the two countries and the continued presence of Tibetan refugees in India can become the pretext for reviewing Indias Tibet policy. The thrust of their argument is that by revising its policy on Tibet, contesting the Chinese authority over Tibet and making China feel insecure in Tibet, India can pressurise China for the early resolution of the boundary dispute.

* No country has ever recognised Tibet as an independent country. Britain had invented the principle of Chinese suzerainty and Tibetan autonomy. The basic motivation for this principle was to secure trade rights in Tibet and make Tibet a buffer. But after its withdrawal from India in 1947, Britain changed its position on Tibet. More recently, in 2008, David Milibands statement on Tibet described Shimla Conference (1914), McMahon Line and suzerainty/autonomy differentiation as an anachronism, thus completely toeing the Chinese line on Tibet. The US has never recognised Tibet as an independent state, and it never considered Tibet as impacting its core national interests even at the height of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, the European Parliament and some European governments have extended their moral support to the Tibetans. But again, there is a limit to this support as China is a strategic partner of the European Union. In short, Tibetans have had no effective international backing except on the human rights issue, which is receding in the background in the face of economic compulsions of the West. It is also unlikely that they will get any backing in the near future.

* Indias own position on Tibet has progressively favoured Chinese authority over Tibet since the 1954 agreement between the two countries in which India surrendered its extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Whatever little ambiguity regarding Indias Tibet policy existed was removed by the Indias declaration during Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayees 2003 visit to China that the Tibetan Autonomous Region is part of Chinese territory. Therefore, if India wants to revise its Tibet policy and begin colouring Tibet differently on maps or issuing stapled visas to Tibetans from Tibet, then it will be the first country to challenge Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.

* To assume that by revising its policy on Tibet, India can get China to address the boundary dispute on Indias terms is far removed from the reality. If India modifies its policy on Tibet in anti-China terms, China will definitely retaliate and further harden its position on the territorial dispute. Any such move by India will justifiably reinforce the Chinese view that India is a following a new forward policy. This situation may or may not bring the two countries to war, but it will certainly wreck whatever has been achieved by the two countries in their bilateral relations. This will create complications for India in Jammu and Kashmir. China is already shifting its position subtly. It is probably true that the shift in Chinas policy on J&K is linked to its worries about stability in Tibet. Any policy revision on Tibet by India will provoke China to formally drop its policy of neutrality over Kashmir further politicising and internationalising the Kashmir issue. Furthermore, India should expect China increasing its resistance and objections to India in various international forums like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

* India can, however, take a more nuanced position by articulating the need for peaceful resolution of Tibetan issue by China domestically so that Tibetan refugees in India can return home with honour. China does not buy the argument presently that it is in its own interest to cut a deal with Dalai Lama. But India can articulate the need for protecting and preserving the cultural and religious autonomy of the Tibetan people and their ethnic identity for the sake of preventing Tibetans from agitating. from its soil. It can also be argued that Indias acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of China is predicated upon its being treated as an autonomous region. This position should, however, be taken only if China continues with its present position on J&K, or if it starts blocking flow of river waters; otherwise, it could be construed by China as an unnecessary and serious provocation.



CHINAS RESPONSE TO THE POST-DALAI LAMA SCENARIO


* Since 1979, there have been two phases of Sino-Tibetan talks: the first in the 1980s till 1986-87, and the second from 2002 onwards. In these talks, China has not conceded an inch whereas the Dalai Lama has come around to accepting the Chinese position on a variety of issues: autonomy, the borders of Tibet, the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Tibet, and adoption of the Hong Kong model. During the talks in the 1980s, Dalai Lamas representatives were pitching for autonomy in which only defence and foreign affairs were to be vested with the central authority. Now, the Dalai Lama has lowered his expectations and indicated that he will be satisfied with cultural and religious autonomy and some degree of political space.

* China does not bother much about the Tibetan community in exile. In fact, it has been insinuated that whenever China has entered into talks with the Dalai Lama, it has done so just to divert the international attention from some internal situation.

* Chinese argument is that the Tibet movement will have no future after the death of the present Dalai Lama. The exiled Tibetan community can, from time to time, cause embarrassment to China but it does not pose any serious threat to it.

* But it is undeniable that Tibet is passing through a phase of unprecedented prosperity compared to the past. This has given rise to a Tibetan middle class that identifies with Chinese rule.11 Over last 60 years, a section of young Tibetan communists has also emerged who occupy the lower and middle rungs of the CPC in Tibet. This section is dead against the Dalai Lama and his return. Therefore, the post-Dalai Lama scenario may not be unfavourable for China. The reincarnation (the new Dalai Lama who will be a child) will take around 20 years to assume full charge. It is not sure whether he will become as adorable a face of the Tibetan movement as the present Dalai Lama. China seems quite assured that the Tibetan movement in exile will drastically weaken in the post-Dalai Lama period.

* The issue of the incarnation, if the successor is found in India, will also create friction between India and China, which may also result in conflict. The post-Dalai Lama period will, therefore, be full of uncertainties.



INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIAN, SOUTHEAST ASIAN
AND EAST ASIAN CONTEXTS




* As far as South Asia is concerned, China recognises that India enjoys a natural social, cultural, political and geographical advantage over it. China is not in a position to erase Indian influence in the region, although it has not stopped trying to do so. According to a Chinese scholar, China divides South Asian countries into two categories: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal in one category, and Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives in the other. China has got strong security and political motives in Pakistan and Nepal, whereas mainly economic considerations prevail in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

* A friendly Pakistan is necessary for security and stability in Xinjiang since China is genuinely convinced about the important role that Pakistan can play in controlling terrorist activities in Xinjiang.

* Chinese policy makers and scholars are extremely sympathetic towards Pakistan and extremely concerned about the internal situation in Pakistan. They insist that the international community should not allow Pakistan to collapse because that would be disastrous for regional security. However, they rule out sending troops into Pakistan to support the Pakistani regime in any scenario except under a UN-led mission. They say that China would extend economic and political assistance to Pakistan. However, it would not want to be trapped in the quagmire of Islamic Jihad. China realises its social, cultural, political and military limitations which will not allow it to replace the US in Af-Pak region or in South Asia at large. Nevertheless, China wants to stay engaged with Pakistan, and it has indicated its strong support for Pakistan and promised never to desert it, during one of the worst periods of political instability, economic hardship and diplomatic isolation that Pakistan has faced for a long time.

* Similar attempts continue to be made to lure Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives into Chinas sphere of influence. The obvious deduction is that China is not willing any more to accept Indias undisputed influence in the region, which allows it enough confidence and freedom to intrude into Indias legitimate area of influence.




IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE MILITARY MODERNISATION
FOR India



* China is expanding its military capabilities at a rapid pace. Modernisation of PLA Navy, Air Force, strategic weapons and development of asymmetric capabilities are a cause for concern. India must take cognizance of Chinas infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and also take note of reference to local war and limited war in the Chinas Defence White Paper of 2010.


KEY DRIVERS


Developments in Tibet, domestic economic and political situation in China, Indias perception of Chinas engagement with its South Asian neighbours, and Chinas perception of Indias own strength and relations with the powers considered hostile by China are the most important drivers in India-China relations. The future trajectory of their relations will depend on how security situation unfolds in Tibet, the trajectory of economic growth and political stability within China, and how they read each others intentionshow India views Chinas relations with its South Asian neighbours and how China perceives Indias relations with the US and Japan, and their mutual perceptions of comparative strengths and vulnerabilities.
NAME- CHITRALEKHA





REFERENCES-

* INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

* IDSA

* GATEWAY HOUSE